The game theory describes the interactions between two players and the pay-off from wining, losing or compromising. Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb)-host interactions were used as an example for the application of the game theory to describe and predict the possibilities of victory for any players. The gene expression for eight main markers of host response and three Mtb virulence factors were assessed in broncho-alveolar lavage of TB + and TB  patients. The game theory showed that a variety of paths exist that players can use, in response to the behaviour of the counterpart. Briefly, according to the "Nash equilibrium", Ag85B is the main virulence factor for Mtb in active phase, however it is the most immunogenic factor if the host can respond by high expression of T-bet and iNOS. In this 2 situation, Mtb can express high levels of ESAT-6 and CFP10 and change the game to the latency, in which host responses by medium expression of T-bet and iNOS and medium level of TGF-β and IDO. Consistently, The IDO expression was 134-times higher in TB + s than the TB  s, and the T-bet expression, ~200-times higher in the TB  s than the TB + s. Furthermore, Mtb-Ag85B had a strong positive association with CCR2, T-bet and iNOS, but had a negative correlation with IDO.
The game theory was applied to the TB positive group, in which the main players in onset of 143 tuberculosis are the host and Mtb. Therefore, their interactions can be modeled in two 144 strategic (Tables 6 and 7) and extensive forms (Fig. 1) through backward induction. In all 145 parts of the method, a dynamic game was assessed from the final (outcome) to the starting 146 stages (initial interactions in infection). The players in this study used their intelligence in 147 sequential attempts to reach a latency situation, which is in an equilibrium status with 148 minimum risk and benefit; however, each player tried to win the game. The competition 149 between the host and Mtb made the model a strictly competitive zero-sum game. To design 150 this game, the first step was to determine two types of interactions: sequential and 151 simultaneous. Therefore, a stage game was considered, in which the players simultaneously 152 performed a static subgame with complete information during each stage while present within 153 a dynamic game and sequentially responding to their opponents [40] [41] [42] . 154 155 Quantification and design of the pay-off matrix 156 Since in a zero-sum game the pay-off for the Mtb is the negative of the pay-off for the host, 157 each zero-sum game can be represented in a simplified form: a reward matrix. The matrix 158 represents the pay-offs for the player who uses the strategies. The expression of main genes 159 including CCR1, CCR2, T-bet, iNOS, TGF-β, Ag85B, CFP-10 and ESAT6 was considered 160 as input data. Gene expression of selected genes have categorized (low/ high/ medium) by 161 discretize by frequency operator and the pay-off matrix is designed based on conditional 162 probability using the naive Bayes classifier (NBC) by Rapid Miner V5.3 software.
163
Designing the extensive form of the game based on subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium 164 and Pareto efficiency 165 166 The extensive form (or game tree) is a graphical representation of a sequential game. The 167 game tree consists of nodes (or vertices), which are points at which players can take actions. 168 They are connected by edges, which represent the actions that may be taken at the node. An 169 initial (or root) node represents Mtb's strategies (SA-SH) which begin the game due to 170 entrance and invasion of bacteria and perform as a trigger for starting an interaction with host 171 (game). Thus, pathways which define as every set of edges from the first node in the tree 172 eventually arrives at the repetition stages, called A-H based on this origination (Mtb's 173 strategies (SA-SH)). Pathways A-H are consist of strategies that constitute a Nash equilibrium 174 7 in every subgame of the original game, and this equilibrium is called the subgame perfect 175 Nash equilibrium (SPE) 40 . As explained earlier, the edges eventually arrive in repetition 176 stages (shown as a dotted line in Figure 1 ) instead of a terminal node, because this is an 177 infinitely repeated game, and the pay-off at the end of the game is calculated as a total pay-178 off and cannot be shown in the extensive form. In infinitely repeated games, the per-period 179 interest rate (r) that results from game repetition is important, and players change the stage 180 pay-off to the present value by a discount factor defined as δ= r + 1 1 . In order to calculate the 181 total pay-off of an infinitely repeated game, a function was first defined as utility of strategy 182 ( u i (s) ) in each stage game (t) for every period (n) as follows:
Then the players present value pay-off (Vi) was calculated, and total pay-off was defined as 185 the sum of the present values in each stage of the game for any time period calculated as:
In infinitely repeated games, patience means is the increase of future pay-off in the present 189 time; on the other hand, with an increase in repetitions, r goes to zero. Then, δ goes to one 190 and future pay-offs resulting from a game repetition are preferred and more valuable than 191 momentary pay-offs 43 ; this is called collusive pricing, which is a subgame Perfect Nash 192 equilibrium outcome and leads to cooperation with Pareto dominant strategies 41 .
193
Parallel subgames' Perfect Nash equilibrium and appropriate response efficiency 194 An equilibrium in which the player's strategy constitutes Nash equilibrium in every parallel 195 subgame set of the original game is a parallel subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (PSPE), 196 which is equal to the appropriate response, because it is determined by the maximization of 197 the minimum pay-offs under consideration of all SPE strategies in a time period 41 . 198 To determine the PSPE, the original game is separated into five parallel subgame sets, each 199 of which refers to a stage. Nash equilibrium joint strategy pay-offs are placed on each set of a 200 parallel subgame, and finally the best strategy of every parallel subgame is selected with the 201 Min-Max method as PSPE. When a PSPE is found in any set of parallel subgames, the 202 8 defined PSPE efficiency index is calculated for each path (A-H). The PSPE efficiency index 203 is a ratio of the number of strategies that match the PSPE in past stages per the number of 204 total strategies in past stages, which is represented as a percentage 41 .
205
If "x" is the number of strategies which matched and "y" is the number of strategies which 206 are unmatched with the PSPE in unrepeated parallel subgames. Also "n0" will be the number 207 of unrepeated parallel subgames, so that n0=x+y 41 .
208
If "nr" is the number of repeated parallel subgames that passed after the number of repetition 209 times "t" and nr = x'+y', then "x'" is the number of strategies matched with the PSPE in 210 repeated parallel subgames and "y՛" is the number of strategies which are unmatched.
211
For paths repeated from the first stage, x' /nr represents the PSPE efficiency index in the 212 repeated parallel subgames. In other paths, this index is represented by x/n0 calculated in 213 unrepeated parallel subgames. Therefore, three types of strategies exist based on PSPE 214 efficiency: PSPE dominant strategy (x>y or x'>y'), PSPE dominated strategy (x<y or x'<y'), 215 and PSPE optimal strategy (x=y or x'=y') 41 .
216
The meaning of dominant and dominated strategies here differs from Pareto dominant and 217 dominated, as this classification of strategies is based on PSPE efficiency, while classification 218 in the previous parts was based on Pareto efficiency 41 .
219
The PSPE efficiency index for each subject of paths repeated from the first stage (L(t) 
The PSPE efficiency index range for the path that earns "x" in unrepeated stages (n0) and
226 "x'" in repeated stages (nr) is equal to [x/ n0, x'/nr), and the paths that are repeated from the 227 first stage and earn "x'" have a constant value equal to x'/nr.
229
Cooperative and grim trigger strategies in the original game 230 At the end of the modeling when all the last stages have been modeled, the game strategies 231 are considered for the repeated stages and eight patient outcomes, and the earlier strategies 232 that are placed in the repeated stages are cooperative strategies 44, 45 . If one player contravenes 233 his obligation, the first strategy that is not placed in the repeated stages is grim trigger 234 9 strategies 43 . Pay-off in a grim trigger strategy is less than that in cooperation strategies and 56.3% were males and 46% were females. However, the differences in age and gender 243 distribution were not statistically significant (Table 2) . Table 3 shows the social and 244 demographic characteristics of the subjects studied. Table 4 shows the comparison of TB The CCR1 gene expression rates of BAL-PBMCs in TB + and TB  patients were 1.1±0.23 and 250 0.34± 0.09, respectively. There was a significant difference in the CCR1 gene expression 251 between TB + patients and TB  controls (p<0.01). Although, the average CCR2 gene 252 expression in TB + was around 3 times higher than the TB  subjects, but no significant 253 difference was observed in 95% confidence level. The CCR2 gene expression rates of BAL-
254
PBMCs in TB + and TB  patients were 0.78±0.21 and 0.29±0.8, respectively (p<0. 1) ( Table   255 5).
256
The T-bet gene expression rates of BAL-PBMCs in TB + and TB  patients were 0.84±0.52 and 257 2.28±1.44, respectively; the difference was significant (p<0.03). The average T-bet gene 258 expression was around 1.53 times higher in TB  patients than in the TB + subjects.
259
The mean mRNA expression rates of iNOS in the BAL-PBMCs from TB + and TB  patients 260 were 0.64±0.29 and 1.72± 0.64, respectively. As shown in Figure 1 , mRNA expression was 261 around 2.68 times higher in healthy carriers than in the TB + patients; however, the difference 262 was not statistically significant (Table 5 ).
263
The mean mRNA expression rates of TGFβ in the BAL-PBMCs of TB + and TB  patients 264 were 0.2± 0.07 and 0.139±0.03, respectively. As shown in Figure 1 , mRNA expression was 265 around 0.69 times higher in TB + patients than in the healthy carriers (p<0.85). However, no 266 10 significant differences were found in the TGFβ mRNA levels between TB + and TB  controls 267 (Table 5 ) ( Fig. 1 ).
268
The IDO-1 gene expression rates of BAL-PBMCs in TB + and TB  patients were 0.67±0.28 269 and 0.034±0.01, respectively. The average IDO-1 gene expression in TB + was around 19.70 270 times higher than the TB  subjects, and the difference was significant (p<0.001) ( Table 5 ).
271
The mean MMP3 mRNA expression rates in the BAL-PBMCs of TB + and TB  patients were 272 0.22±0.09 and 0.64±0.23, respectively, and the difference was not significant ( Fig. 1) 
Evaluation of Pathways by PSPE Efficiency as a Criterion for Appropriate Response

294
PSPE was determined between parallel subgames in each stage, consisted of "h" strategy in 295 t5, a4 (Ag85B (High)) Mtb strategy in t4, the "h" host's strategy against "a5a6" (high levels
296
of CFP-10 and ESAT-6) Mtb strategy in stages t3 and t2, and finally in the paths that followed 297 high levels of Ag85B (A, B, E, and F), the "a" host's strategy, and in other paths that 298 11 followed high levels of CFP-10 and ESAT-6 (C, G, D, and H), the "d" host's strategy ( Figure   299 1).
300 Figure 2 shows the PSPE efficiency indices calculated for each path. This index had a 50% 301 constant value in the B, E, and H paths, classified into the PSPE optimal strategy (latent 302 paths), 20% in the F, C, and G paths, and 40% in the A path, which is classified into the PSPE 303 dominated strategy. The maximum value of this index was related to the D path (80%), which 304 is classified into the PSPE dominant strategy.
305
Moreover, this value can be calculated in each repetition for each path, as figure 2 shows, in 306 time course manner. Therefore, a long latency time could reduce the PSPE efficiency index to 307 less than 80% in the D path, increase the PSPE efficiency index to higher than 20% in the F, 308 C, and G paths, and increase it to more than 40% in the A path. Moreover, a long latency time 309 is beneficial for the path that is classified into the PSPE dominated strategy, and a short 310 latency time is beneficial for the path that is classified into the PSPE dominant strategy ( Fig.   311 2). showed that in the D path, the MMP9 level was classified into the low range; in the A path, it 318 was classified into the low and medium ranges; the B and C paths were related to medium 319 levels of MMP9, and the G and F paths showed high levels of MMP9. Paths E and H had 320 variable values. Paths B and F were classified into high levels of MMP3; the D and C paths 321 were classified into the medium range; the G path showed low levels of MMP3, and the H 322 path was placed in the medium and low ranges. Paths E and A had variable values.
323
Reactivation or Grim Trigger Strategy
324
In the A, C, F, and G paths, the host contravened his obligation in the t1 stage and entered a 325 grim trigger strategy, classified as a PSPE dominated strategy. The pay-off decreased and the 326 PSPE efficiency index diminished from 50% to 20% for the C, F, and G paths and from 50% 327 to 40% for the A path. Therefore, reactivation was performed by inappropriate responses in 328 C, F, and G, and finally led to a bad outcome (high levels of MMP9 in G and F and medium 329 levels in C). In the A path, reactivation performed at a 40% efficiency. This is twice that of 330 12 the C, G, and F paths, even though it was placed on the PSPE dominated strategy. Yet, as a 331 result, this path showed a better outcome with medium and low levels of MMP9.
332
In the D path, Mtb contravened his obligation (high levels of CFP-10 expression as a 333 cooperative strategy) in the t2 stage, and entered a grim trigger strategy (high levels of ESAT-334 6 expression in addition to CFP-10), classifying as a PSPE dominant strategy. Because of this 335 switching, pay-off decreased, and the PSPE efficiency index increased from 50% to 80%.
336
Therefore, reactivation was performed by appropriate responses that led to better outcomes 337 (low levels of MMP9).
338
According to the results, the A, F, C, and G paths represented suitable strategies in latency 339 that were reactive by the host and led to bad outcomes, while the D path represented a 340 suitable strategy in latency that was reactive by Mtb and finally led to a good prognosis.
341
In the B, E, and H paths, no player contravened from his obligation in any of the t1 or t2 342 stages. Therefore, the players remained in their joint cooperative strategies with a constant 343 pay-off and PSPE efficiency index (latent group).
344
Discussion
345
In this study, the status of host-microbe interactions (game) in the onset of TB (win or lose) 346 was investigated in active and latent stages of infection.
347
Therefore, to use game theory, we had to choose suitable variables, which are implicated in interval met significance (0.1). This form of expression is in favour of bacteria as Th2-like 363 cells and monocyte macrophages recruitment and exacerbate airway inflammation.
364
The next step was consistent with this findings as the main difference between TB + and TB  365 patients was the expression of T-bet, which was ~200 times more in the Mantoux positive 366 TB  patients than in the active TB patients. Furthermore, the expression of IDO as an 367 immune-suppressor was 134 times more in TB + than in the TB  patients. In such situation, 368 with a high level of IDO expression as an inducing factor for Treg polarization, a higher 369 expression of TGF-β in TB + patients is expected, while in reality, its expression was 4 times 370 more, but did not meet the 95% CI (P=0.1). followed the strategies, in response to high levels of Mtb Ag85B expression (b and e 391 strategies; Fig. 1) , and others designed different strategies in response to high levels of Mtb 392 CFP-10 expression (h strategy; Fig. 1 ).
393
The best strategy for Mtb in latency is the high level of Ag85B expression that was 394 determined to be a component of PSPE. This can be explained by the fact that Ag85B is a 395 TAG synthase and might be a key player in both cell wall stability and the biosynthesis of
The lower levels of IDO and TGF-β can be in favour of the host, in clearing the infection. extracellular bacteria can persist in chronic granulomas for many years 37 . In a suitable status 518 like immune-compromised host, Mtb can overcome the pressure of the host's immune system 519 and be reactivated. As this model shows, there are direct associations between the strength of 520 virulence factor, Ag85B, CFP-10 and ESAT-6, and the host's immune response, such as CCR-521 1, T-bet, Th1 polarization, IFN- production and iNOS, for macrophage activation.
522
The potentiation of the innate immune response in this model was determined by IFN-γ and 523 iNOS, leading to NO production, and was responsible for the potentiation of the phagocytes 524 for elimination of pathogens. As mentioned, the iNOS expression level is directly related to 525 the severity of virulence factors, regardless of latency or reactivation phase, like T-bet 526 expression. It seems that this is a "tit-for-tat'' strategy, in which one player responds in a stage 527 with the same action that his opponent used in the last stage.
528
For the last stage of the effector phase, MMPs assessment is the outcome of the responses in 529 clearance or pulmonary tissue damage, which can be discussed in the context of the pathways Host's strategies "a", "f" and "cg" are grim trigger strategies and "a5a6" is a grim trigger strategy 707 performing by Mtb that host responded by strategy "d". These strategies are reactivation strategies in 708 favour of Mtb resulted in TB manifestation. Other Mtb and host strategies are cooperative strategies 709 that are related to the latency phase. These means that interaction between host and parasite will moderate by increase the number of 718 encounters of players together and players avoid malicious strategies and move towards cooperation 719 strategies like increase of immune response inhibition by medium level of TGF-β and IDO. Another 720 argument is at last one of two players strategies which are in response to each other in repeated stages, 721 must be placed in PSPE to take shape a cooperation strategy. In A, B, E and F paths Mtb strategy 722 placed in PSPE and in C, D, G and H paths host strategy placed in PSPE. 723 724 725 a'13=CCR1(High), a'14=CCR2(High), a'15=T-bet(High), a'16=iNOS(High) sG: Ag85B(low), CFP-10(High), ESAT-6(High), sH: Ag85B(High), CFP-10(High), ESAT-6(High), 780 28 ‡ ‡ sa: CCR1(high), CCR2 (medium), T-bet (high), iNOS (high), TGF-β (low), IDO (low). 781 sb: CCR1(high), CCR2 (high), T-bet (high), iNOS (high), TGF-β (medium), IDO (medium) 782 scg: CCR1(medium), CCR2 (medium), T-bet (medium), iNOS (medium), TGF-β (low), IDO (low) 783 sd: CCR1 (high), CCR2 (medium), T-bet (medium), iNOS (medium), TGF-β (low), IDO (low) 784 se: CCR1 (medium), CCR2 (high), T-bet (high), iNOS (high), TGF-β (medium), IDO (medium) 785 sf: CCR1 (high), CCR2 (high), T-bet (high), iNOS (high), TGF-β (low), IDO (medium) 786 sh: CCR1 (medium), CCR2 (high), T-bet (medium), iNOS (medium), TGF-β (medium), IDO (medium) 787 788 789 790 Table 7 . Evaluation of action roles in host strategies 
792
Expression of each gene in every host strategy was specialized in all strategies that remained latent (B, E and 793 H paths), levels of TGF-β and IDO placed in medium range and in other paths that reactivated, these genes 794
show low expression. Therefore, levels of TGF-β and IDO were differentiator between latent and reactivated 795 paths. In all host strategies in response to high levels of Ag85B Mtb strategy, T-bet and iNOS expressed in 796 high level while these levels were medium in response to high levels of CFP-10 or CFP-10 and ESAT-6, 797 therefore levels of T-bet and iNOS expression related with type of Mtb strategies. Levels of CCR1 and CCR2 798 related to increase and decrease of Mtb virulence gene expression. High level of CCR1 expression was related 799
to expression of CFP-10 and ESAT-6 in low level and medium level of this chemokine receptor had reverse 800 effect on expression of these virulence genes. When CCR2 expressed in high level, expression of Ag85B 801 placed on high level too, against in medium levels of CCR2 such as C, G and D paths, expression of Ag85B 802 placed on low level. 803 804 805 806
